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1972] NOTES
It has also been asked what effect the prior determination of invalidity will
have on two other possible offensive uses of collateral estoppel." Will the
courts allow such use in a suit for reimbursement of license or royalty costs
assessed prior to the judgment?"5 Will findings of fraudulent procurement
open the door to uncontested antitrust actions under Walker Process Equip-
ment, Inc. v., Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.?'4
Whether the Court's hoped-for economy of time and expense will be
achieved is equally uncertain. Will the second court be able to quickly and
efficiently (as well as justly) decide the issue of whether the patentee-plaintiff
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the merits of the action? Or, will
the second court's review become itself in the nature of an appeal?
The Blonder-Tongue decision has taken a step in the right direction toward
curing some of the injustices inherent in the area of patent litigation. It is time
for Congress to make use of the myriad studies, commentaries, and case prece-
dent in fashioning a more efficient patent litigation system. '
I, Anthony Patterson, Jr.
Nelson v. Keefer and Its Implications in the
Area of Jurisdictional Amount
In a personal injury action the plaintiff claimed $603.50 for physician,
hospital, and drug bills, and $727.69 in property damage. The remainder of
the claim was for inconvenience, pain, and suffering. The attending physician,
in his hospital records, made no reference to any accident, and the treatment
was evidently for diarrhea, pre-existing hemorrhoids, and symptoms of an ulcer.
of invalidity), or the First, Second, and Eighth Circuits in which to institute his suit. Rollins,
supra note 16, at 565. The appropriate answer is a single system of courts to hear patent
suits, or at least a single appellate court. Perhaps the inaction of the Court in Blonder-Tongue
on this problem will prompt Congress to act on the many proposals submitted in the past
advocating such a result. See generally SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPY-
RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., SINGLE COURT
OF PATENT APPEALS-A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 21 (Comm. Print 1959).
" Evans & Robins, supra note 16, at 208. Note also the extension of the Blonder-Tongue
decision into trademark actions in Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Aloe 99, Inc., 170 U.S.P.Q.
538 (Patent Office Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd. 1971).
"What effect is a federal court, or even another state court, to give a defensive plea
of collateral estoppel based on a state court finding of invalidity? In a suit for royalties the
defendant may assert as a defense the invalidity of the plaintiff's patent. Lear, Inc. v. Ad-
kins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). Moreover, "it is well settled that state courts have jurisdiction
to determine matters of title, infringement or validity of patents where such determination
is ancillary and necessary to the main action." Blumenfeld v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 172
U.S.P.Q. 76, 78 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. [1st Dist.] 1971); accord, Pratt v. Paris Gas, Light
& Coke Co., 168 U.S. 225, 259 (1897); Imperial Appliance Corp. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co.,
430 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1970); Zemba v. Rodgers, 145 U.S.P.Q. 628 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1965); American Harley Corp. v. Irvin Indus., Inc., 167 U.S.P.Q. 553 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1970). But cf. the recent decision of Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 437
F.2d 1328 (3d Cit. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 684 (1972), noted at p. 443 supra, urging
state court abstention when the central issue in a case is the validity of a patent.
74 382 U.S. 172 (1965); see text accompanying note 66 supra.
5 See generally Lieberman & Nelson, supra note 16; Rollins, supra note 16, and the
authorities cited therein.
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At a pre-trial conference, the trial judge stated that he would retain the case
for thirty days to allow the plaintiff to provide the court with medical reports
to sustain the causal connection between the medical bills and the accident in
question. When the plaintiff failed to provide such reports, the district judge
dismissed, stating that "with minor injuries, small medical bills of uncertain
causal connection, no loss of income, no absence from work,"' the plaintiff's
claim could not in good faith reach the jurisdictional minimum. Held, affirmed:
Since the trial court was convinced to a legal certainty that the evidence would
not permit it to sustain a verdict for $10,000 or more, the district court proper-
ly dismissed the action for lack of jurisdictional amount. Nelson v. Keefer,
451 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1971).
I. MONETARY JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND INTANGIBLE CLAIMS
From the early stages of the United States judiciary, there has been a juris-
dictional minimum imposed on plaintiffs seeking to have their cases tried in
federal courts." As early as 1796 the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized the problem of determining the amount in controversy when un-
liquidated damages were claimed, and held that the amount claimed should
control.! By 1884, however, the amount claimed was not afforded such great
weight, and the trial court was allowed to dismiss when it found that the claim
had been "laid beyond the amount of a reasonable expectation of recovery, for
the purpose of creating a case removable" to the federal court.! Two years
later, in Barry v. Edmunds,' a case involving damages for trespass, the Court
stated that the trial court could not look beyond the pleadings in a case in-
volving punitive damages. The trial judge could properly dismiss only in cases
in which the terms of a contract limited the possible recovery or an amendment
rendered it apparent that the amount of damages was claimed merely to meet
the jurisdictional requirement of the federal court.! In 1943 the Supreme Court
'Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1971).
' The First Judiciary Act required an amount in controversy of $500. Act of Sept. 24,
1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78. The amount has been increased three times: Act of March 3,
1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552 ($2,000); Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat.
1091 ($3,000); Act of July 25, 1958, PUB. L. No. 85-554, 5§ 1, 2, 72 Star. 415, amending
28 U.S.C. 5§ 1331-32 (1971) ($10,000). A major reason for the increase to $10,000 was
to facilitate the reduction of the federal caseloads. S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1958); H.R. REP. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1959). This goal has not been
met. Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren, 1959 ALI PROCEEDINGS 27. See also Friendly,
The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483 (1928); Phillips &
Christenson, The Historical and Legal Background of the Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.A.J.
959, 963 (1960).
'Hulsecamp v. Teel, 2 U.S. (2 Dail.) 358 (1796). The Court stated that "whatever
distinction might be made in other respects, between suits instituted to recover a sum cer-
tain, and brought to recover damages for a tort, certain it is, that . . . there can be no rule
to ascertain the jurisdiction of the court, but the value laid in the declaration. . . . [T]he
amount of the plaintiff's claim must be considered as the amount in dispute ..... Id.
at 359.
"Smith v. Greenhow, 109 U.S. 669, 671 (1884). The plaintiff had claimed $100 in
actual and $6,000 in punitive damages for trespass.
5 116 U.S. 550, 560 (1886). The Court stated that the error in dismissing was com-
pounded by the erroneous statement that a jury verdict in the amount of the jurisdictional
minimum would have been excessive and therefore set aside; no such statement of the upper
limit of a jury award should have been made before the verdict was in fact rendered. Id.
at 565.61 d. at 561-62.
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reiterated its holding that a trial judge could not be justified in dismissing a
claim for punitive damages when evidence could be introduced at trial justi-
fying a claim for the jurisdictional minimum."
The Supreme Court has thus seemingly precluded a trial judge from finding
a claim for unliquidated damages to be jurisdictionally insufficient unless a
specific rule of law, a contract provision, or independent facts show that the
plaintiff would have no right whatsoever to a verdict in that amount. In ad-
dition, there are no statutory guidelines to aid the trial court in determining
the permissible scope of its inquiry when making such a determination.
II. CIRCUIT COURT INTERPRETATIONS
The absence of any definite guideline has produced two approaches in the
federal courts on the question of whether a trial court is precluded from dis-
missing a claim involving unliquidated damages. One approach, represented
by two Fifth Circuit decisions,8 has allowed the trial judge to dismiss the cause
if he finds that a verdict for the jurisdictional minimum would be only a re-
mote possibility and that the jurisdictional amount is far in excess of the
amount the plaintiff could reasonably recover. The courts evidently either
ignored the language of Barry concerning the prohibition of the pre-award de-
termination of the limit or decided that the holding of Barry applied only to
claims for punitive damages.
The second approach is represented by Wade v. Rogala," a Third Circuit
case in which the court considered the intangible items of recovery and stated
that "[t]o determine in limine that the plaintiff could not produce evidence to
support a verdict in excess of $3,000 would not be justifiable; nor could it be
said that a verdict in excess of $3,000 should be set aside before it was ren-
dered."" Other courts and authorities have taken this language of Rogala to
mean that any case involving unliquidated damages should proceed to trial if
the issue is closely tied to the merits." The Rogala court itself used language
which would imply this meaning:
Indeed, since the issue of jurisdictional amount in this case is so closely tied to
the merits of the cause, insistence upon evidence with respect thereto must be
'Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 243 (1943). The Fifth Circuit
had dismissed on the basis that it was "legally inconceivable" that plaintiff could recover a
sum in excess of $3,000 when the policy sued upon was valued at no more than $1,000.
The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal because punitive damages were recoverable under
the state law. Id. at 240-41.
'Matthiesen v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 286 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1961) (claiming
pain and suffering, no loss of work, and $50 in medical expenses); Leehans v. American
Employers Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1959) (claiming $13,045 for pain, suffering,
disability, and disfigurement from acid allegedly in soap). See also Turner v. Wilson Line,
242 F.2d 414 (1st Cir. 1957) (only mild pain for 7-8 hours, no loss of working time).
"The Court in Barry did not necessarily limit its holding to punitive damages, but stated
that "nothing is better settled than that, in . . . actions for torts . . . it is the peculiar func-
tion of the jury to determine the amount [of recoverable damages]." Barry v. Edmunds,
116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886).
1"270 F.2d 280 (3d Cit. 1959). See also Tullos v. Corley, 337 F.2d 884 (6th Cit.
1964); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Railway Express, 253 F.2d 780 (6th Cit. 1958).
" 270 F.2d at 285. The court cited Barry and Bell. See notes 5, 7 supra.
"Jones v. Landry, 387 F.2d 102 (5th Cit. 1967); Deutsch v. Hewes Street Realty




limited 'lest, under the guise of determining jurisdiction, the merits of the
controversy between the parties be summarily decided without the ordinary
incidents of a trial, including the right to a jury.' . . . The necessary choice,
except in the flagrant case, where the jurisdictional issue cannot be decided
without ... a ruling on the merits, is to permit the cause to proceed to trial."3
In Jones v. Landry' the Fifth Circuit quoted the language of Professor
Wright's comparison of the Fifth Circuit "reasonable" test and the Third Cir-
cuit "flagrant" test."5 Professor Wright had concluded that allowing the trial
judge discretion in determining the reasonable limit of a jury award before
trial comes very close to depriving a claimant of his right to a jury trial. Ap-
parently the Fifth Circuit agreed that the Third Circuit had enunciated the
preferable test: only the flagrant cases should be dismissed."' Nevertheless, in-
stead of expressly adopting the Third Circuit test, the Fifth Circuit attempted
to justify its earlier decisions adhering to the more liberal rule. The court said:
We do not read the Leehans and Matthiesen cases as departing from the rule
advocated by the Third Circuit .... except possibly to the extent of holding
that when it can be conclusively determined in advance that the pain, suffer-
ing, and other intangible factors are so slight that no substantial evidence can
be offered to support a verdict for as much as the jurisdictional amount, then
the legal certainty test is met."'
The Second Circuit also construed Rogala to mean that the trial judge may
not exercise his judgment in this manner. Examining the two rules and citing
the Fifth and Third Circuit cases, the court in Deutsch v. Hewes Street Realty
Corp. chose what it thought to be the Rogala rule and allowed a plaintiff whose
special damages totaled $141 to proceed to trial.1" However, the court stated
that the jurisdictional minimum was far in excess of any verdict that the plain-
tiff could reasonably recover." It is significant that the Second Circuit inter-
preted Rogala to mean that despite the improbability of recovering the juris-
dictional minimum, the court could not validly dismiss without evidence in-
dependent from the merits indicating that the claim was inflated for the sole
purpose of entering the federal courts."
It is not surprising that the Second and Fifth Circuits adopted what they
interpreted as the Third Circuit's Rogala holding concerning the permissible
scope of the trial judge's inquiry. What is surprising is that about the same
13 270 F.2d at 285.
14 387 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1967).
" C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 113.1 The court rejected the defendant's reliance on Leehans and Matthiesen after quoting
Professor Wright's approval of the Third Circuit test. 387 F.2d at 106.
'
T ld.
" 359 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1966).191d. at 98.
201d. at 100-01. The Second Circuit decided the famous case which involved independent
evidence that a claim had been inflated to gain a federal forum. In Arnold v. Troccoli, when
counsel for plaintiff learned that his client would be required to wait for jury trial for two
years in the state courts, he dismissed and raised the amount of the claim in order to enter
the federal court. The record stated that counsel had stated that he was dismissing because
a much earlier trial could be had in a "different" court. 344 F.2d 842, 845 (2d Cir. 1965).
See also Brown v. Bodak, 188 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), in which counsel evidently
was unaware of the 1958 amendment raising the jurisdictional minimum until the case had
been pending for several months.
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time, the Third Circuit began to inform the other courts that Rogala was not
meant to apply so broadly.
One year before the Fifth Circuit's "adoption" of Rogala, the Third Circuit
in Jaconski v. Avisun Corp.2 indicated that it was amenable to a pre-trial dis-
missal even though the plaintiff had claimed unliquidated damages represent-
ing his alleged loss of earnings. The plaintiff claimed $200 in medical bills
and $58,500 for past and future earnings, but the appellate court sent the
case back to the trial judge for further pre-trial hearings regarding the issue of
jurisdictional amount. The court intimated that the district judge should have
plainly informed counsel for the plaintiff that the failure to produce the re-
quested medical reports could result in a jurisdictional dismissal. The position
of the appellate court clearly indicated that the trial court could validly dismiss
if it found on remand that the claim for $10,000 was not valid. The trial judge
had not specifically set forth the basis for the jurisdictional dismissal and the
record was so meager that the appellate court was unable to conclude to a
legal certainty that the plaintiff could not recover the jurisdictional amount."
The fact that the Second and Fifth Circuits apparently misconstrued the Third
Circuit's decision emphasizes the ambiguity of Rogala. Unfortunately, the sub-
sequent Jaconski opinion did not sufficiently clarify the ambiguity.
III. NELSON V. KEEFER
A. The Reasoning of Nelson
In Nelson v. Keefer" the Third Circuit recognized that Wade v. Rogala had
been misinterpreted. Attempting to explain its true meaning, the court in
Nelson used the standard words of "legal certainty" and repeated the language
of Jaconski."4 The Third Circuit evidently felt that this cursory treatment
showed that the Fifth and Second Circuit opinions were obvious misinterpre-
tations of Rogala.
The Jaconski opinion stated that there is no exact guideline for determining
the presence of the jurisdictional minimum when unliquidated damages are
claimed. The courts have, however, developed the requirement of "good faith,"
which has been defined as the requirement that "[ilt must appear to a legal
certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount .... ""
This language has been used frequently by federal courts, but it has not proved
to be an actual test; instead, it has often been a label for the result reached."
21359 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1966).
11 Id. at 937.
23451 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1971).
"Id. at 292-93. The Jaconski court had merely recited the good faith and the legal cer-
tainty language. 359 F.2d at 934-35. See notes 25-28 infra, and accompanying text.
2 St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938).
, For a thorough discussion of the good faith requirement see Note, Good Faith Plead-
ing of Jurisdictional Amount, 48 IowA L. REV. 426 (1963). For a collection of cases show-
ing that the term "good faith" has often been a mere statement of a result, see id. at 429
n.18. Basing the determination of "legal certainty" upon the judge's personal conviction
that a certain claim merely should not be decided in the federal courts violated the language
of the Supreme Court: "It might happen that the judge, on the trial or hearing of a cause,
would receive impressions amounting to a moral certainty that it does not really and sub-
stantially involve a dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction of the court. But upon
such a personal conviction, however strong, he would not be at liberty to act ... " Barry
v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 559 (1886).
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In cases involving unliquidated damages, the real problem is that there has
been no adequate definition of the term "legal certainty." Where damages are
limited by contract or statute and where the state law forbids recovery of cer-
tain damages claimed, "legal certainty" has relevance as a test."' However, in
the area of unliquidated damages, the courts have used language which has
never clearly established what is meant by the term. Instead, the courts have
used such terms as "good faith" and "colorable claim."' Both of these terms
contain the same fault. They are nebulous, subjective, and relevant to the state
of mind of the claimant, which is difficult if not impossible to determine. It
is relatively easy to determine that a claim has been inflated when there are
objective factors such as an amendment to increase a claim with no increase in
pain and suffering between the time of the original claim and the amendment.
Such a determination cannot, however, validly be based upon the great dis-
parity between the actual and unliquidated damages claimed. The courts which
have made such a determination have done so subjectively, since such a claim
does not show positively that the claimant did not act in good faith. How
then can a court say that it is convinced to a legal certainty that the jurisdic-
tional amount was not claimed in good faith?
The Nelson court likewise used the standard words of "good faith" and
"legal certainty" to explain the term "flagrant""9 and thus failed to provide a
justification for its statement that a claim for unliquidated damages should be
dismissed only if the claim was flagrant. The court seemed to equate the term
"flagrant" with "lacking in good faith.""° Actually, the term would seem to re-
quire independent facts showing an inflated claim for the sole purpose of en-
tering the federal courts. 1 The court did not decide if the term "flagrant" also
included those cases in which the actual damages were so slight that the claim
for the unliquidated damages was wholly unreasonable." This mere repetition
of ambiguous language did not justify the Third Circuit's statement that the
other circuit courts had misinterpreted Rogala. Instead it provided support for
the Second and Fifth Circuit interpretations.
The Nelson court glossed over the ambiguity of its previous holding and
2 There are four areas in which the good faith and legal certainty terminology has been
used as a test rather than a mere statement of the result according to one author: (1) where
the plaintiff has amended subsequent to the commencement of the action; (2) where the
plaintiff has failed to offer proof of something easily proved; (3) where the plaintiff mis-
takenly makes a claim barred by a certain fact situation; and (4) where actual damages
are far below the jurisdictional minimum and there is a large claim for pain and suffering.
Note, supra note 26, at 428-34. Legal certainty can also be successfully applied where a
claim is barred by contract, statute, or judicial fiat. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 561-62
(1886).
".St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938).
29451 F.2d at 292-93.
30 Id.
"' The Second Circuit interpreted it in this manner. Deutsch v. Hewes Street Realty Corp.,
359 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cit. 1966).J The Fifth Circuit was uncertain whether such cases would be included. Jones v. Lan-
dry, 387 F.2d 102, 106 (5th Cit. 1967).
'The fact that the court had previously used ambiguous language in its test in the area
of unliquidated damages indicates that the court should not have upheld the summary judg-
ment in this particular case. The Third Circuit has always been careful to preserve the
rights of claimants when it has established a new rule of law. In McSparran v. Weist, 402
F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), the court carefully defined the prospective effect of its holding
when it overruled prior decisions concerning the real party in interest; it then decided
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instead dwelt upon the arguments in favor of limiting federal caseloads. The
Third Circuit stressed the congressional purpose of decreasing the burdensome
caseloads and chastised all of the federal courts for failing to "execute the
congressional mandate in personal injury actions."34 The court emphasized that
sixty percent of all diversity claims are personal injury actions and blamed
this ratio on the "inflexibility" of the "good faith-legal certainty" test."
These considerations laid the foundation for the Third Circuit's enunciation
of a standard for allowing the trial judge great pre-trial discretion to determine
the presence of the jurisdictional amount in cases involving unliquidated
damages. The justifications for this rule were: (1) the congressional intent to
relieve the over-burdened federal courts;' (2) the plethora of personal injury
actions which did not result in awards for the jurisdictional amount;" and
(3) the power of the trial judge to determine the reasonableness or excessive-
ness of an award after it was rendered.' The court stated that it found "no
difficulty" in allowing the court to "evaluate a case prior to trial where suf-
ficient information has been made available through pre-trial discovery and
comprehensive pre-trial narrative statements which disclose medical reports."'
The court may now determine the "upper limit" of a permissible award in-
cluding both actual and intangible items of recovery. If the upper limit does
not "bear a reasonable relation to the minimum jurisdictional floor," the court
perceived "no legal obstacle" to a pre-trial dismissal on jurisdictional grounds.'
B. The Eflect of Nelson
The Third Circuit did not explain what effect the new rule would have upon
the good faith and legal certainty test. Instead, it stated that since the trial
court was "[clonvinced to a legal certainty that the evidence would not permit
it to sustain a verdict for plaintiffs of $10,000 or more," 1 the claim could not
be allowed to proceed to trial. Whether the Third Circuit now equates the
legal certainty test with a determination of unreasonableness upon the hearing
of evidence remains unclear. By its continued use of the standard words of
"legal certainty"' and "good faith,"' the court intimates that it is unwilling
to recognize explicitly the imposition of a stricter standard than it has previous-
ly applied to unliquidated claims.
The Third Circuit has again given an inadequate explanation of the legal
certainty test and has again failed to state its position with sufficient clarity
for the other courts to be able to discern and follow its test. It is indeed
McSparran on the merits. See also Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1968). The
Nelson court should have decided the case on the merits; instead it did not even mention
the availability of a different forum when it dismissed.34451 F.2d at 295.
Id. at 294-95.
3 6 ld. at 294.
"
7 Id. at 294-95 n.11.
8 Id. at 295.
39 Id. at 296.
40 Id. There is, of course, the possibility that Barry v. Edmunds does present a "legal
obstacle." See note 9 supra, and accompanying text.
41 451 F.2d at 298.
4 Id.
'The Third Circuit quoted the statement of the trial court that it was impossible to
see how plaintiff's claim could in "good faith" have reached $10,000. Id. at 297.
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possible that the other circuit courts will take the Nelson opinion to mean that
the trial judge's determination of the upper limit of a permissible jury award
is equivalent to determining to a legal certainty the absence of the jurisdic-
tional minimum. The Third Circuit possibly will respond that it has set up a
test which is a standard in addition to, rather than a part of, legal certainty."
It is evident that the Second and Fifth Circuits will be required to re-examine
their holdings which purported to follow Rogala.' However, they still have
no explanation of what the Third Circuit intends to include within the mean-
ing of the term "flagrant."" They may interpret the term according to the
reasoning of their previous opinions, or they may interpret the term to in-
clude those claims in which the actual damages are so slight as to make the
claim for unliquidated damages wholly unreasonable.
If the other courts choose to follow Nelson, they may be relieved of the
burden of deciding whether to revise the meaning of the term "flagrant." By
adopting the Nelson standard, the trial judge could dismiss after pre-trial hear-
ings should he determine that a verdict for the jurisdictional minimum would
be excessive. This test would indeed seem to be the easiest to apply, since the
question of the state of mind of the claimant would be immaterial.""
If this interpretation prevails, the remaining question is whether the Nelson
standard will reduce the federal caseloads. It is submitted that it will not.
First, the determination by the trial judge at pre-trial will simply divert trial
time into pre-trial hearings. This increase in pre-trial time would cause an
illusion of reducing trial time, but the end result could be an actual increase
in the total time spent in hearing the cause. The hearing of pre-trial testimony
and evidence would often involve as much time as proceeding to trial and dis-
missing as soon as the absence of jurisdictional amount becomes apparent.
Secondly, the question of a jury requirement for the determination of juris-
dictional issues remains unanswered." Since evidence at the pre-trial stage may
be inadmissible at the trial on the merits, two juries might even be required.
A pre-trial jury requirement would greatly overburden the federal judiciary
system.
Finally, the availability of a pre-trial jurisdictional hearing might encourage
a plaintiff to test his frivolous claim of federal jurisdiction. Since the decision
of the judge at the pre-trial hearing will carry great weight, it will be difficult
for the trial court or the appellate court to deny the presence of the jurisdic-
tional minimum which has previously been found. Thus, the courtrooms will
be filled with plaintiffs who otherwise might have hesitated to claim federal
jurisdiction.
"The situation may then be a repetition of the events following the Rogala decision
with the various courts attempting to justify their previous decisions in light of the new
interpretation.
"See text accompanying notes 16, 17 supra.
"'See note 32 supra, and accompanying text.4 7See text accompanying note 28 supra.
"'See, e.g., Note, Trial by Jury of Preliminary Jurisdictional Facts in Federal Courts,




The chronic difficulty of establishing a standard in the area of unliquidated
damages may never be resolved. It is submitted that there are only two possible
standards which will reduce the caseloads of the federal courts. Both measures
are drastic, but necessary in view of the current caseloads. First, the courts can
impose a mathematical relationship between actual damages and punitive or
pain and suffering damages, as well as between actual loss of income and loss
of future earning capacity. This mathematical relation has drawbacks. It would
provide an advantage to those who can afford expensive medical care, and
eliminate from the jurisdictional question the possibility of a rather "inexpen-
sive" injury producing intense suffering.
Another method of reducing the federal caseloads is to increase the effective-
ness of the provision for allocating costs ' when the claim does not meet the
$10,000 requirement. The only way to insure the effectiveness of this sanction
is to apply it to all cases in which less than $10,000 is actually recovered. This
application of the provision for allocating costs has not been used effectively
by the federal courts. Apparently, this standard has been rejected as too harsh,
since no plaintiff can be assured of a jury award in the sum sought, regardless
of the validity of his claim. Applying the sanction when it appears that the
plaintiff did not in good faith assert the presence of the jurisdictional minimum
only reinforces the problem. There is no reason to believe that a good faith
standard will be either more definite or more effective after trial than in the
pre-trial stage.
It is submitted that the Nelson test is a valid one, and that the trial judge
should be allowed to determine the excessiveness of a verdict in the sum of
the jurisdictional minimum. The real utility of the test, however, would not be
in the pre-trial stage, but rather in the determination of the cost allocation after
trial. The trial judge should be quick to deny costs to the plaintiff when it
becomes evident at trial that the jurisdictional amount claim is unreasonable in
light of the evidence offered. In addition, the court should tax costs against the
claimant when it is apparent from independent facts that the plaintiff's claim
was made with a realization of the insufficiency of the claim.
It can be argued that this cost allocation would deny the plaintiff a jury
determination of the reasonableness of the claim. The trial judge could be
allowed to make the determination if indeed there are independent facts
showing that the claim was inflated for the sole purpose of entering the federal
court. In the absence of such independent facts, the jury could determine the
question of whether the claim was unreasonable. Even if the jury determined
the question of reasonableness after trial, the time spent in such a determination
would be far less cumbersome than a pre-trial hearing.
The burden upon the federal courts necessitates drastic measures. These
measures may cause plaintiffs with a valid jurisdictional claim to choose the
" The First Judiciary Act of 1789 allowed the court, at its discretion, to require plaintiff
to pay the costs. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 20, 1 Stat. 83. The applicable statute still
allows the court, at its discretion, to refuse to allow the plaintiff costs and even impose costs
against him if he fails to recover $10,000. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, SS
1, 2, 72 Stat. 415, amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1971).
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state court over the federal; this result will definitely benefit the federal courts.
Hesitance by plaintiffs to enter the federal courtroom will not cause serious
injustice to them, since their hesitance would tend to show that their jurisdic-
tional claims were doubtful. It is true that some plaintiffs who have valid
jurisdictional claims will be assessed costs under this rule. However, any plain-
tiff in a personal injury action, regardless of the forum or the validity of his
claim, risks the possibility of a jury verdict in favor of the defendant and the
consequent possibility that he would be required to pay his own costs and those
of the defendant. The suggested rule merely adds the possibility that even if he
were awarded recovery, the court could require him to pay costs. Concededly,
such a rule would produce some injustice, but the need for a federal caseload
reduction is so great that there is evidently no avenue for alleviating the burden
without some injustice.
Evelyn Hudson Biery
